We show that there exist properties that are maximally hard for testing, while still admitting PCPPs with a proof size very close to linear. Specifically, for every fixed ℓ, we construct a property P (ℓ) ⊆ {0, 1} n satisfying the following: Any testing algorithm for P (ℓ) requires Ω(n) many queries, and yet P (ℓ) has a constant query PCPP whose proof size is
Introduction
Probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) are one of the landmark achievements in theoretical computer science. Loosely speaking, PCPs are proofs that can be verified by reading only a very small (i.e., constant) number of bits. Beyond the construction of highly efficient proof systems, PCPs have myriad applications, most notably within the field of hardness of approximation.
A closely related variant of PCPs, called probabilistically checkable proofs of proximity (PCPPs), was introduced independently by Ben-Sasson et al. [BGH + 06] and Dinur and Reingold [DR06] . In the PCPP setting, a verifier is given oracle access to both an input x and a proof π. It should make a few (e.g., constant) number of queries to both oracles to ascertain whether x ∈ L. Since the verifier can only read a few of the input bits, we only require that it rejects inputs that are far (in Hamming distance) from L, no matter what proof π is provided. PCPPs are highly instrumental in the construction of standard PCPs. Indeed, using modern terminology, both the original algebraic construction of PCPs [ALM + 98] (see also [BGH + 06]) as well as Dinur's [Din07] combinatorial proof utilize PCPPs.
Our Results
Our first main result answers the above question negatively, by constructing a property that is maximally hard for testing, while admitting a very short PCPP. For the exact theorem statement, we let log (ℓ) denote the ℓ times iterated log function. That is, log (ℓ) (n) = log(log (ℓ−1) (n)) for ℓ ≥ 1 and log (0) n = n.
Theorem 1.1 (informal restatement of Theorem 5.2). For every constant integer ℓ ∈ N, there exists a property P ⊆ {0, 1} n such that any testing algorithm for P requires Ω(n) many queries, while P admits a (constant query) PCPP system with proof length O(n · log (ℓ) (n)).
We remark that all such maximally hard properties cannot have constant-query PCPP proofsystems with a sub-linear length proof string (see Proposition 2.10), leaving only a small gap of log (ℓ) (n) on the proof length in Theorem 1.1.
Beyond demonstrating that PCPPs with extremely short proofs exist for some hard properties, we use Theorem 1.1 to derive several applications. We proceed to describe these applications next.
Tolerant Testing. Recall that property testing (very much like PCPPs) deals with solving approximate decision problems. A tester for a property P is an algorithm that given a sublinear number of queries to its input x, should accept (with high probability) if x ∈ P and reject if x is far from P (where, unlike PCPPs, the tester is not provided with any proof).
1 Note that a PCPP for CircuitEval can be easily used to construct a PCP for CircuitSAT with similar overhead (see [ The standard setting of property testing is arguably fragile, since the testing algorithm is only guaranteed to accept all functions that exactly satisfy the property. In various settings and applications, accepting only inputs that exactly have a certain property is too restrictive, and it is more beneficial to distinguish between inputs that are close to having the property, and those that are far from it. To address this question, Parnas, Ron and Rubinfeld [PRR06] introduced a natural generalization of property testing, in which the algorithm is required to accept functions that are close to the property. Namely, for parameters 0 ≤ ε 0 < ε 1 ≤ 1, an (ε 0 , ε 1 )-tolerant testing algorithm is given an oracle access to the input, and is required to determine (with high probability) whether a given input is ε 0 -close to the property or whether it is ε 1 -far from it. As observed in [PRR06] , any standard testing algorithm whose queries are uniformly (but not necessarily independently) distributed, is inherently tolerant to some extent. Nevertheless, for many problems, strengthening the tolerance requires applying advanced methods and devising new algorithms (see e.g., [FN07, KS09, CGR13, BMR16, BCE + 18]).
It is natural to ask whether tolerant testing is strictly harder than standard testing. This question was explicitly studied by Fischer and Fortnow [FF06] , who used PCPPs with polynomial size proofs to show that there exists a property P ⊆ {0, 1} n that admits a tester with constant query complexity, but such that every tolerant tester for P has query complexity Ω(n c ) for some 0 < c < 1. Using modern quasilinear PCPPs [BSS08, Din07] in combination with the techniques of [FF06] it is possible to construct a property demonstrating a better separation, of constant query complexity for standard testing versus Ω(n/polylog n) for tolerant testing.
Using Theorem 1.1 we can obtain an improved separation between testing and tolerant testing:
Theorem 1.2 (informal restatement of Theorem 6.1). For any constant integer ℓ ∈ N, there exist a property of boolean strings P ⊆ {0, 1} n and a constant ε 1 ∈ (0, 1) such that P is ε 0 -testable for any ε 0 > 0 with a number of queries independent of n, but for any ε 0 ∈ (0, ε 1 ), every (ε 0 , ε 1 )-tolerant tester for P requires Ω(n/polylog (ℓ) n) many queries.
Erasure-Resilient Testing. Another variant of the property testing model is the erasure-resilient testing model. This model was defined by Dixit et. al. [DRTV18] to address cases where data cannot be accessed at some domain points due to privacy concerns, or when some of the values were adversarially erased. More precisely, an α-erasure-resilient ε-tester gets as input parameters α, ε ∈ (0, 1), as well as oracle access to a function f , such that at most an α fraction of its values have been erased. The tester has to accept with high probability if there is a way to assign values to the erased points of f such that the resulting function satisfies the desired property. The tester has to reject with high probability if for every assignment of values to the erased points, the resulting function is still ε-far from the desired property. Similarly to the tolerant testing scenario, PCPPs were also used in [DRTV18] to show that there exists a property of boolean strings of length n that has a tester with query complexity independent of n, but for any constant α > 0, every α-erasure-resilient tester is required to query Ω(n c ) many bits for some c > 0, thereby establishing a separation between the models. Later, in [RRV19] PCPP constructions were used to provide a separation between the erasure-resilient testing model and the tolerant testing model.
Similarly to the tolerant testing case, we use Theorem 1.1 to prove a stronger separation between the erasure-resilient testing model and the standard testing model. Theorem 1.3 (informal restatement of Theorem 6.2). For any constant integer ℓ ∈ N, there exist a property of boolean strings P ⊆ {0, 1} n and a constant ε 1 ∈ (0, 1) such that P is ε-testable for any ε > 0 with number of queries independent of n, but for any α = Ω(1/ log (ℓ) n) and ε ∈ (0, ε 1 ) such that ε < 1 − α, any α-erasure-resilient ε-tester is required to query Ω(n/polylog (ℓ) n) many bits.
Secret Sharing applications.
As an additional application of our techniques we also obtain a new type of secret sharing scheme. Recall that in a secret sharing scheme, a secret value b ∈ {0, 1} is shared between n parties in such a way that only an authorized subset of the users can recover the secret. We construct a secret sharing scheme in which no subset of o(n) parties can recover the secret and yet it is possible for each one of the parties to recover the secret, if given access to a PCPP-like proof, with the guarantee that no matter what proof-string is given, most parties will either recover b or reject. We obtain such a secret sharing scheme through a notion called Probabilistically Checkable Unveiling of a Shared Secret (PCUSS), which will be central in our work. This notion is loosely described in Subsection 1.2 and formally defined in Section 4.
Techniques
Central to our construction are (univariate) polynomials over a finite field F. A basic fact is that a random polynomial p : F → F of degree (say) |F|/2, evaluated at any set of at most |F|/2 points, looks exactly the same as a totally random function f : F → F. This is despite the fact that a random function is very far (in Hamming distance) from the set of low degree polynomials. Indeed, this is the basic fact utilized by Shamir's secret sharing scheme [Sha79] .
Thus, the property of being a low degree polynomial is a hard problem to decide for any tester, in the sense that such a tester must make Ω(|F|) queries to the truth table of the function in order to decide. Given that, it seems natural to start with this property in order to prove Theorem 1.1. Here we run into two difficulties. First, the property of being a low degree polynomial is defined over a large alphabet, whereas we seek a property over boolean strings. Second, the best known PCPPs for this property have quasi-linear length [BSS08] , which falls short of our goal.
To cope with these difficulties, our approach is to use composition, or more accurately, an iterated construction. The main technical contribution of this paper lies in the mechanism enabling this iteration. More specifically, rather than having the property contain the explicit truth table of the low degree polynomial p, we would like to use a more redundant representation for encoding each value p(α). This encoding should have several properties:
• It must be the case that one needs to read (almost) the entire encoding to be able to decode p(α). This feature of the encoding, which we view as a secret-sharing type of property, lets us obtain a hard to test property over boolean strings.
• The encoding need not be efficient, and in fact it will be made long enough to eventually subsume the typical length of a PCPP proof-string for the low degree property, when calculated with respect to an unencoded input string.
• Last but not least, we need the value to be decodable using very few queries, when given access to an auxiliary PCP-like proof string. This would allow us to "propagate" the PCPP verification of the property across iterations.
In more detail, we would like to devise a (randomized) encoding of strings in {0, 1} k by strings in {0, 1} m . The third requirement listed above can be interpreted as saying that given oracle access to v ∈ {0, 1} m and explicit access to a value w ∈ {0, 1} k , it will be possible verify that v indeed encodes w using a PCPP-like scheme, i.e. by providing a proof that can be verified with a constant number of queries. We refer to this property as a probabilistically checkable unveiling (PCU) 3 . Note that in our setting a single value w may (and usually will) have more than one valid encoding.
Going back to the first requirement of the encoding, we demand that without a proof, one must query at least Θ(m) bits of v to obtain any information about the encoded w, or even discern that v is indeed a valid encoding of some value. Given this combination of requirements, we refer to the verification procedure as a Probabilistically Checkable Unveiling of a Shared Secret (PCUSS).
Low degree polynomials can be used to obtain a PCUSS based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme. More specifically, to encode a k bit string w, we take a random polynomial whose values on a subset H ⊆ F are exactly equal to the bits of w. However, we provide the values of this polynomial only over the sub domain F \ H. Then, the encoded value is represented by the (interpolated) values of g over H, which admit a PCU scheme. On the other hand, the "large independence" feature of polynomials makes the encoded value indiscernible without a a supplied proof string, unless too many of the values of g over F \ H are read, thus allowing for a PCUSS.
This construction can now be improved via iteration. Rather than explicitly providing the values of the polynomial, they will be provided by a PCUSS scheme. Note that the PCUSS scheme that we now need is for strings of a (roughly) exponentially smaller size. The high level idea is to iterate this construction ℓ times to obtain the ℓ iterated log function in our theorems.
At the end of the recursion, i.e., for the smallest blocks at the bottom, we utilize a linearcode featuring both high distance and high dual distance, for a polynomial size PCUSS of the encoded value. This is the only "non-constructive" part in our construction, but since the relevant block size will eventually be less than log log(n), the constructed property will still be uniform with polynomial calculation time (the exponential time in poly(log log(n)), needed to construct the linear-code matrix, becomes negligible).
Our PCUSS in particular provides a property that is hard to test (due to its shared secret feature), and yet has a near-linear PCPP through its unveiling, thereby establishing Theorem 1.1. We utilize this property for separation results in a similar manner to [FF06] and [DRTV18] , by considering a weighted version of a "PCPP with proof" property, where the proof part holds only a small portion of the total weight. The PCPP proof part enables a constant query test, whereas if the PCPP proof is deleted
Related work
Short PCPPs. For properties which can be verified using a circuit of size n, [BGH + 06] gave PCPP constructions with proof length n · exp(poly(log log n)) and with a query complexity of poly(log log n), as well as slightly longer proofs with constant query complexity. Later, Ben-Sasson and Sudan [BSS08] gave constructions with quasilinear size proofs, but with slightly higher query complexity. The state of the art construction is due to Dinur [Din07] who, building on [BSS08] , showed a PCPP construction with proof length that is quasilinear in the circuit size and with constant query complexity. In a recent work Ben Sasson et al. Tolerant Testing. The tolerant testing framework has received significant attention in the past decade. Property testing of dense graphs, initiated by [GGR98] , is inherently tolerant by the canonical tests of Goldreich and Trevisan [GT03] . Later, Fischer and Newman [FN07] (see also [BEF18] ) showed that every testable (dense) graph property admits a tolerant testing algorithm for every 0 < ε 0 < ε 1 < 1, which implies that O(1) query complexity testability is equivalent to distance approximation in the dense graph model. Some properties of boolean functions were also studied recently in the tolerant testing setting. In particular, the properties of being a k-junta (i.e. a function that depends on k variables) and being unate (i.e., a function where each direction is either monotone increasing or monotone decreasing) [BCE + 18, LW19, DMN19].
Erasure-resilient Testing. For the erasure resilient model, in addition to the separation between that model and the standard testing model, [DRTV18] designed efficient erasure-resilient testers for important properties, such as monotonicity and convexity. Shortly after, in [RRV19] a separation between the erasure-resilient testing model and the tolerant testing model was established. The last separation requires an additional construction (outside PCPPs), which remains an obstacle to obtaining better than polynomial separations.
Preliminaries
We start with some notation and central definitions. For a set A, we let 2 A denote the power-set of A. For two strings x, y ∈ {0, 1} * we use x ⊔ y to denote string concatenation.
For an integer k, a field F = GF(2 k ) and α ∈ F, we let α ∈ {0, 1} k denote the binary representation of α in some canonical way. Throughout this paper we use boldface letters to denote random variables, and assume a fixed canonical ordering over the elements in all the sets we define. For a set D, we write v ∼ D to denote a random variable resulting from a uniformly random choice of an element v ∈ D.
Error correcting codes and polynomials over finite fields
The relative Hamming distance of two strings x, y ∈ Σ n is defined as dist(x, y) = 1 n · |{i ∈ [n] | x i = y i }|. For a string x ∈ Σ n and a non-empty set S ⊆ Σ n , we define dist(x, S) = min y∈S dist(x, y). The following plays a central role in many complexity-related works, including ours. Definition 2.1. A code is an injective function C : Σ k → Σ n . If Σ is a finite field and C is a linear function (over Σ), then we say that C is a linear code. The rate of C is defined as k/n, whereas the minimum relative distance is defined as the minimum over all distinct x, y ∈ Σ k of dist(C(x), C(y)).
An ε-distance code is a code whose minimum relative distance is at least ε. When for a fixed ε > 0 we have a family of ε-distance codes (for different values of k), we refer to its members as error correcting codes.
In this work we use the fact that efficient codes with constant rate and constant relative distance exist. Moreover, there exist such codes in which membership can be decided by a quasi-linear size Boolean circuit. Theorem 2.2 (see e.g., [Spi96] ). There exists a linear code Spiel : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} 100k with constant relative distance, for which membership can be decided by a k · polylog k size Boolean circuit.
Actually, the rate of the code in [Spi96] is significantly better, but since we do not try to optimize constants, we use the constant 100 solely for readability. In addition, the code described in [Spi96] is linear time decodeable, but we do not make use of this feature throughout this work.
We slightly abuse notation, and for a finite field F of size 2 k , view the encoding given in Theorem 2.2 as Spiel : F → {0, 1} 100k , by associating {0, 1} k with F in the natural way. Note that for f : F → F, it holds that f (β) ∈ {0, 1} k for every β ∈ F, and therefore Spiel(f (β)) ∈ {0, 1} 100k . We slightly abuse notation, and for a function f : F → F we write Spiel(f ) to denote the length 100k · 2 k bit string β∈F Spiel(f (β)) (where we use the canonical ordering over F).
The following lemma of [Hor72] , providing a fast univariate interpolation, will be an important tool in this work.
Lemma 2.4 ([Hor72]
). Given a set of pairs {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x r , y r )} with all x i distinct, we can output the coefficients of p(x) ∈ F[X] of degree at most r − 1 satisfying p(
3 (r)) additions and multiplications in F.
The next lemma states that a randomly chosen function λ : F → F is far from any low degree polynomial with very high probability.
Lemma 2.5. With probability at least 1 − o(1), a uniformly random function λ :
Proof: Consider the size of a ball of relative radius 1/3 around some function λ : F → F in the space of functions from F to itself. The number of points (i.e., functions from F → F) contained in this ball is at most
By the fact that the size of C F is |F| |F|/2+1 , the size of the set of points that are at relative distance at most 1/3 from any point in C F is at most
The lemma follows by observing that there are |F| |F| functions from F to itself.
Dual distance of linear codes
We focus here specifically on a linear code C : F k → F n , and consider the linear subspace of its image,
We define the distance of a linear space as dist(V ) = min v∈V \{0 n } dist(v, 0 n ), and note that in the case of V being the image V C of a code C, this is identical to dist(C). For a linear code, it helps to investigate also dual distances.
Definition 2.6. Given two vectors u, v ∈ F n , we define their scalar product as u · v = i∈[n] u i v i , where multiplication and addition are calculated in the field F. Given a linear space V ⊆ F n , its dual space is the linear space V ⊥ = {u : ∀v ∈ V, u · v = 0}. In other words, it is the space of vectors who are orthogonal to all members of V .The dual distance of the space V is simply defined as dist(V ⊥ ).
For a code C, we define its dual distance, dist ⊥ (C), as the dual distance of its image
The following well-known lemma is essential to us, as it will relate to the "secret-sharing" property that we define later.
Lemma 2.7 (See e.g., [MS77, Chapter 1, Theorem 10]). Suppose that C : F k → F n is a linear η-dual distance code, let Q ⊂ [n] be any set of size less than η ·n, and consider the following random process for picking a function u : Q → F: Let w ∈ F k be drawn uniformly at random, and set u be the restriction of C(w) to the set Q. Then, the distribution of u is identical to the uniform distribution over the set of all functions from Q to F.
Probabilistically checkable proofs of proximity (PCPP)
As described briefly in the introduction, a PCPP verifier for a property P is given access to an input x and a proof π, as well as a detection radius ε > 0 and soundness error δ > 0. The verifier should make a constant number of queries (depending only on ε, δ) to the input x and the proof π, and satisfy the following. If x ∈ P, then there exists π for which the verifier should always accept x. If dist(x, P) > ε, the verifier should reject x with probability at least δ, regardless of the contents of π. More formally, we define the following.
Definition 2.8 (PCPP).
For n ∈ N, let P ⊂ {0, 1} n be a property of n-bit Boolean strings, and let t ∈ N. We say that P has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t Probabilistically Checkable Proof of Proximity (PCPP) system if the following holds: There exists a verification algorithm V that takes as input ε, δ > 0 and n ∈ N, makes a total of q(ε, δ) queries on strings w ∈ {0, 1} n and π ∈ {0, 1} t , and satisfies the following:
1. (Completeness) If w ∈ P, then there exists a proof π = Proof P (w) ∈ {0, 1} t such that for every ε, δ > 0, the verifier V accepts with probability 1.
(Soundness)
If dist(w, P) > ε, then for every alleged proof π ∈ {0, 1} t , the verifier V rejects with probability greater than δ.
The following lemma, establishing the existence of a quasilinear PCPP for any property P that is verifiable in quasilinear time, will be an important tool throughout this work.
Lemma 2.9 (Corollary 8.4 in [Din07] , see also [GM07] ). Let P be a property of Boolean strings which is verifiable by a size t Boolean circuit. Then, there exists a length-t ′ PCPP system for P, that for every ε, δ > 0 makes at most q(ε, δ) queries, where t ′ = t · polylog t.
As described briefly in the introduction, maximally hard properties cannot have a constant query PCPP proof systems with a sublinear length proof string.
Proposition 2.10. Let P ⊆ {0, 1} n and ε > 0 be such that any ε-tester for P has to make Ω(n) many queries. Then, any constant query PCPP system for P (for e.g., where δ = 1/3) must have proof length of size Ω(n).
Proof: Suppose that there exists a PCPP for P with O(1) queries and proof length t = o(n). Since the PCPP verifier has constant query complexity, we may assume that it is non adaptive and uses q = O(1) queries. By a standard amplification argument, we can construct an amplified verifier that makes O(q · t) = o(n) queries, with soundness 2 −t /3. By the fact that the verifier is non-adaptive, it has the same query distribution regardless of the proof string. Therefore, we can run 2 t amplified verifiers in parallel while reusing queries, one verifier for each of the 2 t possible proof strings. If any of the 2 t amplified verifiers accept, we accept the input. If the input belongs to P, one of the above 2 t verifiers will accept (the one that used the correct proof). If the input was ε-far from P, then by a union bound, the probability that there was any accepting amplified verifier is at most 1/3. This yields an o(n) tester for P, which contradicts our assumption.
Testing, tolerant testing and erasure-resilient testing
In this subsection we define notions related to the property testing framework . We also formally define a few variants of the original testing model that will be addressed in this work.
A property P of n-bit boolean strings is a subset of all those strings, and we say that a string x has the property P if x ∈ P.
Given ε ≥ 0 and a property P, we say that a string x ∈ {0, 1} n is ε-far from P if dist(x, P) > ε, and otherwise it is ε-close to P. We next define the notion of a tolerant tester of which standard (i.e. intolerant) testers are a special case.
Definition 2.11 (Intolerant and tolerant testing). Given 0 ≤ ε 0 < ε 1 ≤ 1, a q-query (ε 0 , ε 1 )-testing algorithm T for a property P ⊆ {0, 1} n is a probabilistic algorithm (possibly adaptive) makingueries to an input x ∈ {0, 1} n that outputs a binary verdict satisfying the following two conditions. 1. If dist(x, P) ≤ ε 0 , then T accepts x with probability at least 2/3.
2. If dist(x, P) > ε 1 , then T rejects x with probability at least 2/3.
When ε 0 = 0, we say that T is an ε 1 -testing algorithm for P, and otherwise we say that T is an (ε 0 , ε 1 )-tolerant testing algorithm for P.
Next, we define the erasure-resilient testing model. We start with some terminology. A string x ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n is α-erased if x i is equal to ⊥ on at most αn coordinates. A string x ′ ∈ {0, 1} n that differs from x only on coordinates i ∈ [n] for which x i = ⊥ is called a completion of x. The (pseudo-)distance dist(x, P) of an α-erased string x from a property P is the minimum, over every completion x ′ of x, of the relative Hamming distance of x ′ from P. Note that for a string with no erasures, this is simply the Hamming distance of x from P. As before, x is ε-far from P if dist(x, P) > ε, and ε-close otherwise.
Definition 2.12 (Erasure-resilient tester). Let α ∈ [0, 1) and ε ∈ (0, 1) be parameters satisfying α + ε < 1. An q-query α-erasure-resilient ε-tester T for P is a probabilistic algorithm makingueries to an α-erased string x ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n , that outputs a binary verdict satisfying the following two conditions. 1. If dist(x, P) = 0 (i.e., if there exists a completion x ′ of x, such that x ′ ∈ P), then T accepts x with probability at least 2/3.
2. If dist(x, P) > ε (i.e., if every completion of x ′ of x is ε-far from P), then T rejects x with probability at least 2/3.
The next lemma will be useful to prove that some properties are hard to test. The lemma states that if we have two distributions whose restrictions to any set of queries of size at most q are identical, then no (possibly adaptive) algorithm making at mostueries can distinguish between them.
Definition 2.13 (Restriction). Given a distribution D over functions f : D → {0, 1} and a subset Q ⊆ D, we define the restriction D| Q of D to Q to be the distribution over functions g : Q → {0, 1}, that results from choosing a function f : D → {0, 1} according to D, and setting g to be f | Q , the restriction of f to Q.
Lemma 2.14 ( [FNS04] , special case). Let D 1 and D 2 be two distributions of functions over some domain D. Suppose that for any set Q ⊂ D of size at most q, the restricted distributions D 1 | Q and D 2 | Q are identically distributed. Then, any (possibly adaptive) algorithm making at mostueries cannot distinguish D 1 from D 2 with any positive probability.
Code Ensembles
It will be necessary for us to think of a generalized definition of an encoding, in which each encoded value has multiple legal encodings.
Definition 3.1 (Code ensemble).
A code ensemble is a function E : Σ k → 2 Σ m . Namely, every x ∈ Σ k has a set of its valid encodings from Σ m . We define the distance of the code ensemble as
It is useful to think of a code ensemble E : Σ k → 2 Σ m as a randomized mapping, that given x ∈ Σ k , outputs a uniformly random element from the set of encodings E(x). Using the above we can define a shared secret property. In particular, we use a strong information theoretic definition of a shared secret, in which o(m) bits do not give any information at all about the encoded value. Later on, we construct code ensembles with a shared secret property.
Definition 3.2 (Shared Secret). For m, k ∈ N and a constant ζ > 0, we say that a code ensemble C : {0, 1} k → 2 ({0,1} m ) has a ζ-shared secret property it satisfies the following. For any Q ⊆ [m] of size |Q| ≤ ζm, any w, w ′ ∈ {0, 1} k such that w = w ′ , and any t ∈ {0, 1} |Q| it holds that
Namely, for any w = w ′ and any Q ⊆ [m] of size at most ζm, the distribution obtained by choosing a uniformly random member of C(w) and considering its restriction to Q, is identical to the distribution obtained by choosing a uniformly random member of C(w ′ ) and considering its restriction to Q.
A construction of a hard code ensemble
We describe a construction of a code ensemble for which a linear number of queries is necessary to verify membership or to decode the encoded value. This code will be our base code in the iterative construction. The existence of such a code ensemble is proved probabilistically, relying on the following simple lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Fix constant α, β > 0 where β log(e/β) < α. Let s, t ∈ N so that s ≤ (1 − α)t. Then, with probability 1 − o(1), a sequence of s uniformly random vectors {v 1 , . . . , v s } from {0, 1} t is linearly independent, and corresponds to a β-distance linear code.
Proof: The proof follows from a straightforward counting argument. If we draw s uniformly random vectors v 1 , . . . , v s ∈ {0, 1} t , then each non-trivial linear combination of them is in itself a uniformly random vector from {0, 1} t , and hence has weight less than β with probability at most
where we set γ = β log(e/β) < α. By a union bound over all 2 s ≤ 2 (1−α)t possible combinations, the probability that there exists a linear combination with weight less than β is at most 2 (γ−α)t = o(1). If this is not the case, then v 1 , . . . , v s are linearly independent, and moreover, {v 1 , . . . , v s } corresponds to a β-distance linear code (where we use the fact that the distance of a linear code is equal to the minimal Hamming weight of a non-zero codeword).
Our construction makes use of a sequence of vectors that correspond to a high-distance and high-dual distance code, as described below.
Definition 3.4 (Hard code ensemble H k ). Let k ∈ N and let {v 1 , . . . , v 3k } be a sequence of vectors in {0, 1} 4k such that Span{v 1 , . . . , v 3k } is a 1/30-distance code, and that Span{v k+1 , . . . , v 3k } is a 1/30-dual distance code. Let
We define the code ensemble H k : {0, 1} k → 2 {0,1} 4k as H k (w) = {Au : u ∈ {0, 1} 3k where u| {1,...,k} = w}, where all operations are over GF(2).
The next lemma states that a collection of random vectors {v 1 , . . . , v 3k } in {0, 1} 4k satisfies the basic requirements of a code ensemble H k with high probability (that is, with probability tending to one as k → ∞), and hence such a code ensemble exists.
Lemma 3.5. A set {v 1 , . . . , v 3k } of random vectors in {0, 1} 4k satisfies with high probability the following two conditions: Span{v 1 , . . . , v 3k } is a 1/30-distance code, and Span{v k+1 , . . . , v 3k } is a 1/10-dual distance code. In particular, for all k large enough the code ensemble H k exists.
Proof: We apply Lemma 3.3 multiple times. First, picking t = 4k, s = 3k, α = 1/4, and β = 1/30, we conclude that v 1 , . . . , v 3k with high probability correspond to a 1/30-distance code.
To show that with high probability the code spanned by the last 2k vectors has high dual distance, we compare the following two processes, whose output is a linear subspace of (GF(2)) 4k , that we view as a code: (i) Choose 2k vectors and return their span. (ii) Choose 4k − 2k = 2k vectors and return the dual of their span. Conditioning on the chosen 2k vectors being linearly independent, the output distributions of these two processes are identical. Indeed, by a symmetry argument it is not hard to see that under the conditioning, the linear subspace generated by Process (i) is uniformly distributed among all rank-2k subspaces V of (GF(2)) 4k . Now, since we can uniquely couple each such V with its dual V ⊥ (also a rank-2k subspace) and since V = (V ⊥ ) ⊥ , this means that the output distribution of Process (ii) is uniform as well.
However, it follows again from Lemma 3.3 (with t = 4k, s = 2k, α = 1/2, and any β > 0 satisfying the conditions of the lemma) that the chosen 2k vectors are independent with high probability. This means that (without the conditioning) the output distributions of Process (i) and Process (ii) are o(1)-close in variation distance. Applying Lemma 3.3 with t = 4k, s = 2k, α = 1/2, and β = 1/10 we get that the distance of the code generated by Process (i) is at least β = 1/10 with high probability. However, the latter distance equals by definition to the dual distance of the code generated by Process (ii). By the closeness of the distributions, we conclude that the dual distance of Process (i) is also at least 1/10 with high probability.
We next state a simple but important observation regarding membership verification.
Observation 3.6. Once a matrix A with the desired properties is constructed (which may take exp(k 2 ) time if we use brute force), given w ∈ {0, 1} k , the membership of v in H k (w) can be verified in poly(k) time (by solving a system of linear equations over GF(2)).
4
PCUs and PCUSSs
Next, we define the notion of Probabilistically Checkable Unveiling (PCU). This notion is similar to PCPP, but here instead of requiring our input to satisfy a given property, we require our input to encode a value w ∈ {0, 1} k (typically using a large distance code ensemble). We then require that given the encoded value w, it will be possible to prove in a PCPP-like fashion that the input is indeed a valid encoding of w.
Definition 4.1 (PCU). Fix m, t, k ∈ N, and let C : {0, 1} k → 2 {0,1} m be a code ensemble. We say that C has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t PCU if the following holds. There exists a verification algorithm V that takes as inputs ε, δ > 0, m ∈ N, and w ∈ {0, 1} k , makes at most q(ε, δ) queries to the strings v ∈ {0, 1} m and π ∈ {0, 1} t , and satisfies the following:
1. If v ∈ C(w), then there exists a proof π = Proof C (v) ∈ {0, 1} t such that for every ε, δ > 0, the verifier V accepts with probability 1.
2. If dist(v, C(w)) > ε, then for every alleged proof π ∈ {0, 1} t , the verifier V rejects v with probability greater than δ.
In order to facilitate the proof of the main theorem, we utilize a more stringent variant of the above PCU definition. Instead of supplying w ∈ {0, 1} k to the algorithm, we supply oracle access to a a string τ ∈ {0, 1} 100k that is supposed to represent Spiel(w), along with the proof π, and the algorithm only makes q(ε, δ) queries to the proof string π, the original encoding v and the string τ . For cases where v ∈ C(w), we use Value(v) to denote Spiel(w).
Definition 4.2 (Spiel-PCU).
Fix m, t, k ∈ N, and let C : {0, 1} k → 2 {0,1} m be a code ensemble. We say that C has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t Spiel-PCU if the following holds. There exists a verification algorithm V that takes as inputs ε, δ > 0, m ∈ N, makes at most q(ε, δ) queries to the strings v ∈ {0, 1} m , τ ∈ {0, 1} 100k and π ∈ {0, 1} t , and satisfies the following:
1. If there exists w ∈ {0, 1} k for which v ∈ C(w) and τ = Value(v) = Spiel(w), then there exists a proof π = Proof C (v) ∈ {0, 1} t such that for every ε, δ > 0, the verifier V accepts with probability 1.
2. If for every w ∈ {0, 1} k either dist(τ, Spiel(w)) > ε or dist(v, C(w)) > ε, then for every alleged proof π ∈ {0, 1} t , the verifier V rejects v with probability greater than δ.
Note that a code ensemble admitting a Spiel-PCU automatically admits a PCU. Indeed, given the string w, an oracle for Spiel(w) can be simulated.
The following lemma states the existence of Spiel-PCU for efficiently computable code ensembles, and will be used throughout this work. The proof follows from Lemma 2.9 together with a simple concatenation argument.
Lemma 4.3. Let k, m, t ∈ N be such that t ≥ m, and let C : {0, 1} k → 2 {0,1} m be a code ensemble. If given w ∈ {0, 1} k and v ∈ {0, 1} m , it is possible to verify membership of v in C(w) using a circuit of size t, then there is a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t ′ Spiel-PCU for C where t ′ = t · polylog t. (note that ξ ≥ 1), and define
where (Spiel(w)) ξ denotes the ξ-times concatenation of Spiel(w). For any string u it is possible to check, using a quasilinear size circuit (see [Spi96] ), that the substring that corresponds to the domain of (Spiel(w)) ξ is a ξ-times repetition of Spiel(w) for some w. After doing so, we decode w using a quasilinear size circuit (as in [Spi96] ), and then, by the premise of the lemma, we can verify membership in C(w) using a circuit of size t. Therefore, membership in C eq can be decided using a O(t) size boolean circuit, and therefore by Lemma 2.9 admits a PCPP system whose proof length is quasilinear in t.
Given an input v to Spiel-PCU, let v ′ = v ⊔ (Spiel(w)) ξ and use the PCPP system for C eq , with detection radius ε/3 and soundness δ, where each query to v ′ is emulated by a corresponding query to v or Spiel(w). Note that if v ∈ C(w), then v ′ ∈ C eq , so the PCPP system for C eq will accept with probability 1.
Next, suppose that dist(v, C(w)) > ε, and observe that this implies that v ′ is at least ε/3-far from C eq . Thus, by the soundness property of the PCPP for C eq , the verifier rejects with probability at least δ, regardless of the contents of the alleged proof π it is supplied with.
Next we define Probabilistically Checkable Unveiling of a Shared Secret (PCUSS).
Definition 4.4. For m, k, t ∈ N, we say that a function C : {0, 1} k → 2 ({0,1} n ) has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t PCUSS, if C has a shared secret property, as well as C has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t PCU. Similarly, when C has a shared secret property (for constant ζ), as well as C has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t Spiel-PCU, we say that C has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t Spiel-PCUSS.
Note that C admitting a Spiel-PCUSS directly implies that it admits a PCUSS with similar parameters.
The following lemma establishes the existence of a Spiel-PCUSS for H k , where H k is the code ensemble from Definition 3.4.
Lemma 4.5. For any k ∈ N, H k has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t ′ Spiel-PCUSS where t ′ = poly(k).
Proof: By Observation 3.6, given w, membership in H k (w) can be checked in poly(k) time, which means that there exists a polynomial size circuit that decides membership in H k (w). Combining the above with Lemma 4.3 implies a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t ′ Spiel-PCU where t ′ = poly(k). By Lemma 2.7, the large dual distance property of H k implies its shared secret property for some constant ζ, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
PCUSS construction
In this section we give a construction of code ensembles that admit a PCUSS. First we show that our code ensemble has a PCU with a short proof. Specifically, Lemma 5.1. For any fixed ℓ ∈ N and any k ∈ N, there exists n 0 (ℓ, k) and a code ensemble E (ℓ) : {0, 1} k → 2 ({0,1} n ) , such that for all n > n 0 (ℓ, k), the code ensemble E (ℓ) has a q(ε, δ)-query length-t PCU, for t = O(n · polylog (ℓ) n).
Later, we prove that our code ensemble has a shared secret property, which implies that it has a PCUSS (which implies Theorem 1.1, as we shall show).
Theorem 5.2. For any fixed ℓ ∈ N and any k ∈ N, there exists n 0 (ℓ, k) and a code ensemble E (ℓ) : {0, 1} k → 2 ({0,1} n ) , such that for all n > n 0 (ℓ, k), the code ensemble E (ℓ) has a q(ε, δ)-query length-t PCUSS, for t = O(n · polylog (ℓ) n).
The iterated construction
Our iterative construction uses polynomials over a binary finite field GF(2 t ). In our proof we will need to be able to implement arithmetic operations over this field efficiently (i.e., in poly(t) time). This can be easily done given a suitable representation of the field: namely, a degree t irreducible polynomial over GF(2). It is unclear in general whether such a polynomial can be found in poly(t) time. Fortunately though, for t = 2 · 3 r where r ∈ N, it is known that the polynomial x t + x t/2 + 1 is irreducible over GF(2) (see, e.g., [Gol08, Appendix G]). We will therefore restrict our attention to fields of this form. At first glance this seems to give us a property that is defined only on a sparse set of input lengths. However, towards the end of this section, we briefly describe how to bypass this restriction. We next formally define our iterated construction, starting with the "level-0" construction as a base case. The constants c, d in the definition will be explicitly given in the proof of Lemma 5.8. Additionally, for any ℓ ∈ N, we shall pick a large enough constant c ℓ that satisfies several requirements for the "level-ℓ" iteration of the construction.
Definition 5.3 (Iterated coding ensemble). For k ∈ N and w ∈ {0, 1} k , we define the base code ensemble of w (i.e., level-ℓ code ensemble of w for ℓ = 0) as
Let c, d ∈ N be large enough global constants, fix ℓ > 0, let c ℓ be large enough, and let F be a finite field for which |F| ≥ max{c ℓ , c · k}.
We define the level-ℓ code ensemble of w ∈ {0, 1} k over F as follows. Let r ∈ N be the smallest integer such that (log |F|) d ≤ 2 2·3 r , set F ′ = GF 2 2·3 r and k ′ = log |F|. Note that these satisfy the recursive requirements of a level-(ℓ − 1) code ensemble provided that c ℓ is large enough (specifically we require (log |F|) d−1 > c, so that |F ′ | ≥ ck ′ ). Finally, let H ⊆ F be such that |H| = k, and define
(Note that for ℓ = 1 we just use E (1)
) for every β ∈ F \ H and g| H = w (where we identify the 0 and 1 elements of F with 0 and 1 bits respectively). When the context is clear, we sometimes omit the subscripts.
Our choice of the constants c, d, c ℓ needs to satisfy the following conditions. The constant c is chosen such that H will not be an overly large portion of F (this requirement is used in Lemma 5.14). The constant d is needed to subsume the length of PCPP proof string which is part of the construction (this requirement is used in Lemma 5.8). Finally, the constant c ℓ needs to be large enough to enable iteration (as explained in Definition 5.3 itself).
Let ℓ ≥ 0 be some fixed iteration. The following simple observation follows by a simple inductive argument using the definition of the level-ℓ coding ensemble, and in particular that
, where log (ℓ) n is the log function iterated ℓ times.
When the field F is clear from context, we shall usually write m (ℓ) as a shorthand for m (ℓ)
F . The following lemma, proved in the next subsection, establishes the existence of short length Spiel-PCUs for our code ensembles.
Lemma 5.5. For any ℓ ≥ 0, the code ensemble E (ℓ) F,k admits a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t Spiel-PCU for
Proof of Lemma 5.5
We start by defining the PCU proof string for a given v ∈ E (ℓ) F,k (w) for some w ∈ {0, 1} k .
Definition 5.6 (The PCU Proof String).
We define the proof string for v, Proof (0) (v), as the one guaranteed by Lemma 4.5 (note that the length of Proof (0) (v) is poly(k)).
For ℓ > 0, let g ∈ C F and w ∈ {0, 1} k be such that v ∈ β∈F\H E (ℓ−1) ( g(β) ), Value (ℓ) (v) = Spiel(w) and g| H = w. In addition, set
F,k is defined as follows.
where the code ensemble L : {0, 1} k → 2 {0,1} O(|F|·log |F|) is defined as follows. Given w ∈ {0, 1} k , S ∈ L(w) if and only if there exists a polynomial g ∈ C F such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. g| H = w. Spiel(g(β) ).
S = β∈F\H
The following lemma establishes the existence of a Spiel-PCU for L.
Lemma 5.7. L has a q(ε, δ)-query length-t Spiel-PCU for t = O(|F| · polylog |F|).
Proof: By Theorem 2.2, there exists a quasilinear size circuit that decodes Spiel(α). Using such a circuit, we can decode g(β) from S for every β ∈ F. Then, using all the values g(β) and w (where the i-th bit of w correspond to the value of the i-th element in H according to the ordering), we use Theorem 2.4 to interpolate the values and achieve a representation of a polynomial g : F → F.
If g ∈ C F we accept S and otherwise we reject. Since deciding if S ∈ L(w) has a quasilinear size circuit, by Lemma 4.3, there is a quasilinear length Spiel-PCU for L.
Having defined Proof (ℓ) , we first provide an upper bound on the bit length of the prescribed proof string. For ℓ > 0, let z
F,k denote the bit length of the proof for membership in E (ℓ) as defined in Definition 5.6, where for ℓ = 0 we replace the (nonexistent) field F with |w|.
The following lemma, establishing the proof string's length, relies on our choice of the constant d in Definition 5.3. In particular, d needs to be large enough to subsume the size of Proof L (·) Lemma 5.8. For any ℓ ≥ 0, we have that z
Proof: The proof follows by induction on ℓ. The base case (ℓ = 0) follows directly from the definition of P (0) by our convention that log (0) |w| = |w|. Consider ℓ > 0, and note that since the size of S v is O(|F| log |F|), the size of Proof L (S v ) is O(|F| · polylog |F|). By combining the above with the definition of the proof string we have
, and
In addition, by the fact that m ℓ = Θ(|F| · m (ℓ−1) ) and the induction hypothesis we obtain
So overall, we get that z (ℓ)
Next, for an alleged proof π = Proof (ℓ) (v), we use the notation π| Dom(X) to denote the restriction of π to the bits that correspond to X in π as defined in Definition 5.6. For example, π| Dom(Value (ℓ−1) (v β )) refers to the bits that represent
We introduce the verifier procedure for E (ℓ) F,k (see Figure 1) , and prove its completeness and soundness.
Verifier-Procedure E (ℓ)
Input: Parameters ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), an input v ∈ {0, 1} m (ℓ) , an alleged value τ ∈ {0, 1} 100k of v, and an alleged proof π ∈ {0, 1}
1. If ℓ = 0, use the PCU for E (0) with parameters ε and δ.
If ℓ > 0:
(a) Use the PCU verifier for L with error ε/300 and soundness δ, to verify the unveiling of π| Dom(Sv ) , using τ as the value oracle and π| Dom(Proof L (Sv)) as the proof oracle.
(b) For 6/ε many times:
i. Pick β ∈ F \ H uniformly at random.
ii. Use the PCU verifier procedure for E (ℓ−1) with parameters ε/3 and 2δ, to verify the unveiling of v β , using π| Dom(Value (ℓ−1) (v β )) as the value oracle and π| Dom(Proof (ℓ−1) (v β )) as the proof oracle.
If any of the stages rejected then Reject, and otherwise Accept. Lemma 5.9. If there exist w ∈ {0, 1} k for which v ∈ E (ℓ) F,k (w), then Verifier-Procedure E (ℓ) accepts v with probability 1 when supplied with oracle access to the corresponding Proof (ℓ) (v) and τ = Value (ℓ) (v) = Spiel(w).
Proof:
The proof follows by induction on ℓ. The base case follows directly from Lemma 4.5. Hence, the verifier for E (0) supplied with Proof (0) (v) as the proof oracle and Value (ℓ) (v) as the value oracle, will accept v with probability 1.
Assume that Verifier-Procedure E (ℓ−1) accepts with probability 1 any valid encoding v ′ when supplied with the corresponding oracles for Value (ℓ−1) (v ′ ) and Proof (ℓ−1) (v ′ ). Let v ∈ E (ℓ) and write v = β∈F\H v β , where there exist w ∈ {0, 1} k and g ∈ C F such that for all β ∈ F \ H, v β ∈ E (ℓ−1) (g(β)), where g| H = w and τ = Value (ℓ) (v) = Spiel(w). Then, by the definition of the language L and the first two components of Proof (ℓ) (v), Step (2a) of Verifier-Procedure E (ℓ) will always accept. In addition, for every β ∈ F \ H, we have that v β ∈ E (ℓ−1) , and therefore by the induction hypothesis, Step (2b) of Verifier-Procedure E (ℓ) will accept the corresponding unveiling for any picked β ∈ F \ H.
Lemma 5.10. If for every w ∈ {0, 1} k either dist(τ, Spiel(w)) > ε or dist(v, E (ℓ) (w)) > ε (or both), then with probability greater than δ, Verifier-Procedure E (ℓ) will reject v regardless of the contents of the supplied proof string.
Proof: Let τ ∈ {0, 1} 100k be an alleged value for v, and π ∈ {0, 1} z (ℓ) F,k be an alleged proof string for v. We proceed by induction on ℓ. For ℓ = 0 we use the PCU verifier for E (0) with error ε and soundness δ to check that v is a member of the code ensemble E (0) and τ is its value. If the PCU verifier for E (0) rejects with probability at most δ, then there exist w ∈ {0, 1} k such that dist(v, E (0) (w)) ≤ ε and dist(τ, Spiel(w)) ≤ ε, and the base case is complete.
Next assume that the lemma holds for ℓ − 1. If the PCU verifier for L in Step (2a) rejects with probability at most δ, then there exist a function g ∈ C F and w ∈ {0, 1} k for which g| H = w so that dist(π| Dom(Sv) , Spiel(g| F\H )) ≤ ε/300 and dist(τ, Spiel(w)) ≤ ε/300.
In particular, the leftmost inequality means that for at most ε 3 |F \ H| of the elements β ∈ F \ H, it holds that dist(π| Dom(
We refer to elements β ∈ F \ H satisfying the above inequality as bad elements, and to the rest as good elements. Let G denote the set of good elements. Next, we show that if the loop that uses the PCU verifier for E (ℓ−1) in Step (2b) rejects with probability at most δ, then for at most an ε/3 fraction of the good β ∈ F \ H, it holds that
Assume that there are more than ε 3 · |G| good elements such that dist v β , E (ℓ−1) ( g(β) ) > ε/3. Then, by our induction hypothesis, each of them will be rejected by the PCU verifier for E (ℓ−1) with probability more than 2δ. In addition, with probability at least 1/2 we sample at least one such good β, and then during this iteration the verifier in Step (2b(ii)) rejects with conditional probability more than 2δ, and hence the verifier will reject with overall probability more than δ. Summing everything up, when the input is rejected with probability at most δ,
where the three summands are respectively the contribution to the distance of the bad elements, the good elements with v β being far from any level ℓ − 1 encoding of g(β) , and all the other elements.
The proof of Lemma 5.5 follows directly by combining Lemma 5.8, Lemma 5.9 and Lemma 5.10.
The following corollary follows directly from Lemma 5.5 and the definition of Spiel-PCU (Definition 4.2), and implies Lemma 5.1.
Corollary 5.11. Let F be a finite field and k ∈ N which satisfy the requirements in Definition 5.3.
Then, for every ℓ ≥ 0 the coding ensemble E (ℓ)
has a q(ε, δ)-query, length-t
The Lower Bound
We turn to prove the linear query lower bound for the testability of our property. We start by defining distributions over strings of length m (ℓ) .
Distribution D (ℓ)
yes (w): Given w ∈ {0, 1} k , we define the distribution D
yes (w) to be the uniform distribution over elements in E (ℓ) (w).
no is drawn by the following process. For ℓ = 0, v is a uniformly random string in {0, 1} 4k . For ℓ > 0, we pick a uniformly random function λ : F \H → F, and let v be a uniformly random element of β∈F\H E (ℓ−1) ( λ(β) ) Lemma 5.12. For any ℓ ≥ 0, every w ∈ {0, 1} k and q = o(m (ℓ) /10 ℓ ), any algorithm making at mostueries cannot distinguish (with constant probability) between v ∼ D (ℓ) yes (w) and u which is drawn according to any of the following distributions:
yes (w ′ ) for any w ′ = w.
D (ℓ)
no .
Note that Item (1) in the above follows immediately from Item (2). Additionally, the first item implies the shared secret property of the code ensemble E (ℓ) . Furthermore, we remark that that above lemma implies a more stringent version of PCUSS. In addition to the shared secret property, Item (2) implies that the ensemble E (ℓ) is indistinguishable from strings that are mostly far from any encoding (i.e., drawn from D (ℓ) no ). The proof of Lemma 5.12 follows by induction over ℓ. Before we continue, we introduce some useful lemmas that will be used in the proof.
Lemma 5.13. For any ℓ ≥ 0 and w, w ′ ∈ {0, 1} k for which w = w ′ it holds that
Proof: The proof follows by induction over ℓ. The base case for ℓ = 0 follows directly by the fact that the code from Definition 3.4 has high distance, and in particular dist(E (0) (w), E (0) (w ′ )) > 1/10. Assume that the lemma holds for ℓ − 1. Namely, for w, w ′ ∈ {0, 1} k ′ for which w = w ′ it holds that
for some g, g ′ ∈ C F such that g| H =w and g ′ | H =w ′ . By the fact that g and g ′ are degree |F|/2 polynomials (which are not identical), we have that g and g ′ disagree on at least |F \ H|/4 of the elements β ∈ F \ H. By applying the induction hypothesis on the minimum distance between E (ℓ) ( g(β) ) and E (ℓ) ( g ′ (β) ), for all β such that g(β) = g ′ (β), we have that
Lemma 5.14. For any ℓ ≥ 0, with probability at least 1 − o(1), a string v drawn from D
no satisfies dist(v, E (ℓ) (w)) = Θ 1/4 ℓ+1 for all w ∈ {0, 1} k .
Proof: The proof follows by induction over ℓ. For ℓ = 0, fix some w ∈ {0, 1} k . Consider the size of a ball of relative radius 1/40 around some v ∈ E (0) (w) in the space of all strings {0, 1} 4k . The number of strings contained in this ball is at most
Thus, the size of the set of strings which are at relative distance 1/40 from any legal encoding of some word w ∈ {0, 1} k is at most
This implies that with probability at least 1 − o(1), a random string from {0, 1} 4k is 1/40-far from
no . Then, v ′ can be written as
where λ : F \ H → F is a uniformly random function. On the other hand, each memberṽ of P (ℓ) can be written asṽ = β∈F\H
for some g ∈ C F such that g| H = w for some w ∈ {0, 1} k . Note that by Lemma 5.13, whenever λ(β) = g(β), we have that the minimum distance between anyṽ ∈ E (ℓ−1) ( g(β) ) and v ′ ∈ E (ℓ−1) ( λ(β) ) is at least Θ(1/4 ℓ ). In addition, by Lemma 2.5, we have that that with probability at least 1 − o(1), a uniformly random function λ : F → F is 1/3-far from any g ∈ C F . By the restrictions on k in Definition 5.3, which implies that |H| ≤ |F |/c, we can ensure (by the choice of c) that with probability at least 1 − o(1), that a uniformly random λ : F \ H → F is at least 1/4-far from the restriction g| F\H . This implies that for at least |F \ H|/4 of the elements β ∈ F \ H, we have that λ(β) = g(β). Therefore, we have that dist(v ′ , E (ℓ) (w)) = 1 4 · Θ 1 4 ℓ = Θ 1/4 ℓ+1 for all w ∈ {0, 1} k , and the proof is complete.
Lemma 5.15. Fix any ℓ > 0, and suppose that for any w ′ ∈ {0, 1} k ′ , and for any set Q ′ of at most q yes (w) can be thought of as first drawing a uniformly random function g ∈ C F such that g| H = w, and for every β ∈ F \ H, letting v β be a uniformly random element in E (ℓ−1) ( g(β) ). For each β ∈ F \ H we set Q β = Q ∩ Dom(v β ), and define the set of big clusters
Note that since |Q| ≤ |F \ H| · q (ℓ−1) F ′ ,k ′ /10, we have that |I| ≤ |F \ H|/10. By the fact that g is a uniformly random polynomial of degree |F|/2 > |I|, we have that g| I is distributed exactly as λ| I (both are a sequence of |I| independent uniformly random values), which implies that v| j∈I Q j is distributed exactly as v ′ | j∈I Q j . Next, let F\(I ∪H) = {i 1 , . . . , i |F\(I∪H)| } be a subset ordered according to the canonical ordering over F. We proceed by showing that
by induction over t.
The base case (t = 0) corresponds to the restriction over j∈I Q j , which was already proven above. For the induction step, let T = {i 1 , . . . , i t−1 } ⊆ F \ (I ∪ H) be an ordered subset that agrees with the canonical ordering on F, and let i t ∈ F\(H ∪T ∪I) be the successor of i t−1 according to the ordering. We now prove that for each x ∈ {0, 1} m (ℓ) for which v| j∈I∪T Q j has a positive probability of being equal to x| j∈I∪T Q j , conditioned on the above event taking place (and its respective event
Observe that conditioned on the above event, v| Q i t is distributed exactly as a uniformly random element in E (ℓ−1) (ρ) for some ρ ∈ {0, 1} k ′ (which follows some arbitrary distribution, possibly depending on x| j∈I∪T Q j ), while v ′ | Q i t is distributed exactly as a uniformly random element in E (ℓ−1) (y) for a uniformly random y ∈ {0, 1} k ′ . By the fact that |Q it | ≤ q Proof: By induction on ℓ. For ℓ = 0 and any w ∈ {0, 1} k , by the fact that our base encoding E (0) (w) is a high dual distance code, we can select (say) q (0) = k/c (for some constant c > 0), making the assertion of the lemma trivial.
Assume that for any w ′ ∈ {0, 1} k ′ , and any set of queries Q ′ of size at most O(m (ℓ−1) /10 ℓ−1 ) the conditional distributions D Corollary 5.17. Let F be a finite field and k ∈ N which satisfy the requirements in Definition 5.3.
Then, for every ℓ ≥ 0, the coding ensemble E (ℓ)
has q(ε, δ)-query length-t
Handling arbitrary input lengths
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, our construction of code ensembles relies on the fact that operations over a finite field GF(2 t ) can be computed efficiently. In order to do so we need to have an irreducible polynomial of degree t over GF(2), so that we have a representation GF(2 t ). Given such a polynomial, operations over the field can be implemented in polylogarithmic time in the size of the field. By [Gol08] (Appendix G), we know that for t = 2 · 3 r where r ∈ N, we do have such a representation. However, the setting of t restricts the sizes of the fields that we can work with, which will limit our input size length. We show here how to extend our construction to a set of sizes that is "log-dense". For a global constant c ′ , our set of possible input sizes includes a member of [m ′ , c ′ m ′ ] for every m ′ . Moving from this set to the set of all possible input sizes now becomes a matter of straightforward padding.
For any n ∈ N, let r be the smallest integer such that n < 2 2·3 r and let F = GF(2 2·3 r ). We make our change only at the level-ℓ construction. First, we use 4d instead of d in the calculation of the size of F ′ . Then, instead of using F \ H as the domain for our input, we use E \ H, for any arbitrary set E ⊆ F of size n ≥ max{4k, |F| 1/4 , c ℓ } that contains H. Then, for the level-ℓ, instead of considering polynomials of degree |F|/2, we consider polynomials of degree |E|/2. The rest of the construction follows the same lines as the one defined above. This way, all of our operations can be implemented in polylogarithmic time in |E|.
Separations of testing models
In this section we use Theorem 5.2 to prove a separation between the standard testing model, and both the tolerant and the erasure resilient testing models. Specifically, we prove the following.
Theorem 6.1 (Restatement of Theorem 1.2). For every constant ℓ ∈ N, there exist a property Q (ℓ) and ε 1 = ε 1 (ℓ) ∈ (0, 1) such that the following hold.
1. For every ε ∈ (0, 1), the property Q (ℓ) can be ε-tested using a number of queries depending only on ε (and ℓ).
2. For every ε 0 ∈ (0, ε 1 ), any (ε 0 , ε 1 )-tolerant tester for Q (ℓ) needs to make Ω(N/10 ℓ ·polylog (ℓ) N ) many queries on inputs of length N .
Theorem 6.2 (Restatement of Theorem 1.3). For every constant ℓ ∈ N, there exist a property Q (ℓ) and ε 1 = ε 1 (ℓ) ∈ (0, 1) such that the following hold.
2. For every ε ∈ (0, ε 1 ) and any α = Ω(1/ log (ℓ) N ) satisfying ε + α < 1, any α-erasure resilient ε-tester for Q (ℓ) needs to make Ω(N/10 ℓ · polylog (ℓ) N ) many queries on inputs of length N .
In order to prove the separation we use the code ensemble E (ℓ)
F,k where k is set to 0. Namely, we consider E F,0 (∅). Note that in this case, the code ensemble becomes a property (i.e. a subset of the set of all possible strings).
Next, we define the property that exhibits the separation between the standard testing model and both the tolerant testing model and the erasure resilient model. We prove Theorem 6.1 and mention the small difference between the proof of Theorem 6.1 and the proof of Theorem 6.2. We first show that Q (ℓ) can be tested using a constant number of queries in the standard testing model.
Testing Algorithm for Q (ℓ)
Input: Parameter ε ∈ (0, 1), an oracle access to x ∈ {0, 1} N . ) and τ be the empty string.
Run the PCU verifier for E (ℓ)
F,0 with parameters ε/3 and δ = 2/3 on v, using π as the alleged proof for v, and τ as the alleged value for v. Lemma 6.4. The property Q (ℓ) has a tester with query complexity depending only on ε.
Proof: We show that the algorithm described in Figure 2 is a testing algorithm for Q (ℓ) . We assume that n is large enough so that log (ℓ) n > 6/ε.
Assume that x ∈ Q (ℓ) . Then, there exists a string y ∈ E Next, assume that x is ε-far from Q (ℓ) , and let y ′ = x 1 , . . . , x n . Note that if x 1 , . . . , x z (ℓ) F,0 ·log (ℓ) n is ε/2-far from being (z ′ ) s , then the loop in Step 2 rejects x with probability at least 2/3, and we are done. If x 1 , . . . , x z (ℓ)
is ε/2-close to (y ′ ) s , then y ′ must be ε/3-far from E F,0 bits from π, we can get a proof stringπ which will make the PCPP verifier acceptỹ. By our assumption that 6/ε < log (ℓ) n, the total number of changes to the input string x is at most
which is a contradiction to the fact that x is ε-far from E (ℓ) F,0 . Finally, having proved that y ′ is ε/3-far from E (ℓ) F,0 , the PCU verifier for E (ℓ) F,0 (when called with parameters ε/3 and δ = 2/3) rejects with probability at least 2/3. Lemma 6.5. For every constant ℓ ∈ N, there exists ε 1 def = Θ(1/4 ℓ ) such that for every ε 0 < ε 1 , any (ε 0 , ε 1 )-tolerant tester for Q (ℓ) needs to make at least Ω N 10 ℓ ·polylog (ℓ) N many queries.
Proof: Fix some constant ℓ ∈ N. The proof follows by a reduction from 2ε 1 -testing of E (ℓ) F,0 . Given oracle access to a string y ∈ {0, 1} n which we would like to 2ε 1 -test for E (ℓ) F,0 , we construct an input string x ∈ {0, 1} N where N = (log (ℓ) n + 1) · z (ℓ) F,0 as follows.
That is, we concatenate z (ℓ) F,0 · log (ℓ) n/n copies of y, and set the last z (ℓ) F,0 bits to 0. Note that a single query to the new input string x can be simulated using at most one query to the string y.
If y ∈ E (ℓ) F,0 , then for large enough n we have that x is ε 0 -close to Q (ℓ) , since the last z (ℓ) F,0 bits that are set to 0 are less than an ε 0 -fraction of the input length.
On the other hand, if dist(x, E
F,0 ) > 2ε 1 , since each copy of y in x is 2ε 1 -far from E (ℓ)
-far from Q (ℓ) (note that
> 1/2). Therefore, an (ε 0 , ε 1 )-tolerant tester for Q (ℓ) would imply an 2ε 1 -tester for E (ℓ) F,0 with the same query complexity. By Lemma 5.12, since for some ε 1 = Θ(1/4 ℓ ), every 2ε 1 -tester for E (ℓ) F,0 requires Ω(n/10 ℓ ) queries on inputs of length n, any (ε 0 , ε 1 )-tolerant tester for Q (ℓ) requires to make Ω N 10 ℓ ·polylog (ℓ) N many queries.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: The proof follows by combining Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.5.
Proof of Theorem 6.2: The proof of Theorem 6.2 is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 6.1. The only difference is that we replace Lemma 6.5 with a counterpart for erasure resilient testing, where instead of setting the last z F,0 , noting that the relative size of this part of the input is 1/(s + 1) = Θ(1/ log (ℓ) (N )).
